On the question of secret probability distributions in quantum bit
  commitment by Cheung, Chi-Yee
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
02
48
9v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
4 A
pr
 20
19
On the question of secret probability distributions in
quantum bit commitment
Chi-Yee Cheung∗
Institute of Physics, Academia Sinica
Taipei, Taiwan 11529, Republic of China
Abstract
The proof of the No-Go Theorem of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment depends on
the assumption that Alice knows every detail of the protocol, including the probability distributions
associated with all the random variables generated by Bob. We argue that this condition may not
be universally satisfied. In fact it can be shown that when Bob is allowed to use a secret probability
distribution, the joint quantum state is inevitably mixed. It is then natural to ask if Alice can still
cheat. A positive answer has been given by us [13] for the perfect concealing case. In this paper,
we present a simplified proof of our previous result, and extend it to cover the imperfect concealing
case as well.
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Quantum bit commitment is an important two-party primitive in quantum cryptography,
because a secure quantum bit commitment protocol can be used to guarantee the security
of a number of other cryptographic protocols.[1–9]
Bit commitment involves a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob). Alice commits to Bob a
secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} and at the same time provides him with a piece of evidence. When Alice
unveils the secret bit sometime in the future, Bob can check the evidence and verify that
the unveiled bit is the same as what was committed by Alice in the beginning. Now Alice
and Bob do not trust each other, in the sense that Bob would try to gain information about
the committed bit (from the provided evidence) before Alice unveils it, and Alice would try
to change her commitment if it is to her advantage to do so. A bit commitment protocol is
said to be secure if, (1) Bob cannot know the value of b before Alice reveals it (concealing),
and (2) Alice cannot change b without Bob’s knowledge (binding).
In quantum bit commitment (QBC), Alice and Bob together execute a series of quantum
and classical operations during the commitment procedure, such that in the end Bob holds
a quantum state ρbB which serves as the evidence of Alice’s commitment. If
ρ0B = ρ
1
B, (1)
the protocol is said to be perfect concealing, and obviously Bob is not able to extract any
information about the value of b from the ρbB in his possession. For imperfect protocols, the
two density matrices are equal only asymptotically as the security parameter N →∞. For
large but finite N , one has
ρ0B ≈ ρ1B, (2)
so that Bob’s knowledge of b (before Alice unveils it) vanishes in the limit N →∞.
If a QBC protocol is secure even if both Alice and Bob had unlimited computing power,
then it is said to be unconditionally secure. Unfortunately unconditionally secure quantum
bit commitment is ruled out by a no-go theorem [10, 11]. In essence the theorem says that,
if a protocol is concealing to Bob, then it is cannot be binding to Alice. That means, if
ρ0B = ρ
1
B, then using a unitary transformation UA Alice has the freedom to rotate ρ
0
B into ρ
1
B
or vice versa by operating on her own quantum particles only. As a result she can commit
to one bit value and safely unveils another without Bob’s knowledge. It is not hard to
see that this no-go conclusion depends on the assumption that Alice can always calculate
UA without the help of Bob, which is equivalent to saying that she knows “every detail of
the protocol, including the distribution of probability of a random variable generated by
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another participant” [12]. However it is not obvious that this condition is universally valid
in all possible QBC protocols. And when it is not, the validity of the no-go proof needs to
be reexamined.
In the picture where all random variables are purified (that is, where all unrevealed clas-
sical choices are left undetermined by quantum entanglement), the only parameters that can
remain secret are probability distributions. The problem of secret probability distributions
in QBC has been addressed partially in [13], where we showed that for perfect concealing
protocols Alice can still safely cheat even if she does not know the probability distribution
Bob used to entangle a random variable. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simplified
proof of our earlier result, furthermore we show that the same conclusion applies to imperfect
concealing protocols as well.
To facilitate our discussion, we shall first outline the proof of the no-go theorem below.
The crucial observation is that, using quantum entanglement, Alice and Bob can keep all
undisclosed classical information undetermined and stored at the quantum level. In other
words, they can always choose to delay any prescribed classical actions without consequences
until it is required to disclose the outcomes. Then one can assume that, at the end of the
commitment procedure, there exists a pure state |ψbAB〉 in the joint Hilbert space of Alice
and Bob HA ⊗ HB. |ψbAB〉 is called a purification of the quantum state ρbB in Bob’s hand,
such that
TrA |ψbAB〉〈ψbAB| = ρbB. (3)
Note that, because HA and HB are disjoint, whether Bob actually purifies or not is irrelevant
to Alice, without loss of generality she can assume he always does. In general, purification
requires access to fully functioning quantum computers, which is nevertheless not a problem
since both participants are assumed to have unlimited computational power.
For the perfect concealing case, where ρ0B = ρ
1
B, it can be shown that the two purifications
|ψ0AB〉 and |ψ1AB〉 are related by a unitary transformation on Alice’s side [14], namely,
|ψ1AB〉 = UA|ψ0AB〉 (4)
If Alice knows all the parameters used by Bob, then she can compute and then execute UA
without Bob’s help. That means she can commit to b = 0 but safely unveil b = 1 (or vice
versa); this is called the entanglement attack. It follows that perfect concealing protocols
are not binding.
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Next we consider the imperfect case where ρ0B and ρ
1
B are close but unequal. Quantita-
tively that means the fidelity F of the two density matrices is close to one. Using Uhlmann’s
theorem [15], we can write
F (ρ0B, ρ
1
B) = max |〈φ0AB|φ1AB〉| = 1− ǫ, (5)
where ǫ→ 0 as the security parameter N →∞, |φ0AB〉 and |φ1AB〉 are purifications of ρ0B and
ρ1B respectively, and the maximization is over all possible purifications. Uhlmann’s theorem
also implies that, for a fixed purification |ψ1AB〉 of ρ1B, there exists an optimal purification
|ϕ0AB〉 of ρ0B such that
F (ρ0B, ρ
1
B) = |〈ψ1AB|ϕ0AB〉| = 1− ǫ. (6)
Since |ψ0AB〉 and |ϕ0AB〉 are two purifications of the same density matrix ρ0B, by the previous
argument, there must exist a unitary transformation UA such that |ϕ0AB〉 = UA|ψ0AB〉, so
|〈ψ1AB|UA|ψ0AB〉| = 1− ǫ. (7)
So Alice can also cheat when ρ0B ≈ ρ1B, provided that she knows UA.
Mathematically the no-go theorem only proves that there exists a unitary transformation
UA which can turn ψ
0
AB to ψ
1
AB, either exactly or asymptotically. As mentioned before, for
the no-go theorem to be valid, one must also assume that Alice knows how to calculate UA
by herself in every possible protocol. But that is by no mean obvious.
For example it may occur that the wavefunction |ψbAB〉 depends on a certain parameter ω
secretly chosen by Bob, then UA may also depend on ω and it would be unknown to Alice,
unless proven otherwise. If so, could Alice still cheat?
One may doubt if this is a valid question, for what we are saying is that |ψbAB〉 may
be unknown to Alice and she is actually dealing with a mixed state, while as we saw the
proof of the no-go theorem depends critically on the assumption that |ψbAB〉 is pure. The
original idea of the no-go proof is that whenever there is a random variable which renders
the quantum state a mixed one, Alice can always work with the corresponding purified state.
But that is possible only if she knew the probability distribution associated with the random
variable in question. However if the probability distribution (ω) is unknown, then the state
is inevitably a mixed one, and any further purification attempt using another unknown
probability distribution will not change that.
So the question being raised here is this: If a protocol allows Bob to choose a probability
distribution ω which is not disclosed to Alice, could she still cheat by entanglement attack?
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Unfortunately the answer is positive for both perfect and imperfect concealing protocols, as
we shall show in the following.
Consider first the perfect concealing case. It has been discussed in [13], and we are
presenting here a simplified and improved proof. Suppose ω1 and ω2 are any two possible
probability distributions that Bob can use, the concealing condition implies that
|ψ1AB(ω1)〉 = UA(ω1)|ψ0AB(ω1)〉, (8)
|ψ1AB(ω2)〉 = UA(ω2)|ψ0AB(ω2)〉, (9)
where UA(ω1) and UA(ω2) are unitary operators acting on Alice’s particles. Obviously Bob
has the freedom to entangle his choices, in which case the overall state is given by
|ΨbAB〉 =
√
p |ψbAB(ω1)〉|λ1〉+
√
1− p |ψbAB(ω2)〉|λ2〉, (10)
where p is a real number, 0 < p < 1, |λ1,2〉 are ancilla states controlled by Bob, and
〈λ1|λ2〉 = 0. The protocol should remain concealing, so |Ψ0AB〉 and |Ψ1AB〉 are again connected
by a unitary transformation:
|Ψ1AB〉 = U˜A|Ψ0AB〉, (11)
where U˜A may or may not depend on p, ω1, and ω2. Since the ancilla states |λ1〉 and |λ2〉
are not affected by UA, and they are orthogonal, it is easy to see that
|ψ1AB(ω1)〉 = U˜A|ψ0AB(ω1)〉, (12)
|ψ1AB(ω2)〉 = U˜A|ψ0AB(ω2)〉. (13)
Comparing these relations with with Eqs. (8,9), we get
UA(ω1) = U˜A = UA(ω2), (14)
for arbitrary ω1 and ω2. Hence U˜A depends neither on p nor ω. Therefore, as long as ρ
0
B = ρ
1
B,
Alice can calculate UA without the knowledge of the ω actually employed by Bob.
Next we consider the imperfect case, where the density matrices on Bob’s side ρ0B and
ρ1B are close but not equal. As in the perfect concealing case, if ω1 and ω2 are two possible
choices for Bob, then the concealing condition guarantees that there exist optimal unitary
operators UA(ω1) and UA(ω2) such that,
|〈ψ1AB(ω1)|UA(ω1)|ψ0AB(ω1)〉| = 1− ǫ1, (15)
|〈ψ1AB(ω2)|UA(ω2)|ψ0AB(ω2)〉| = 1− ǫ2, (16)
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where 0 < ǫ1,2 < 1, and ǫ1,2 → 0 as the security parameter N approaches infinity. As before
when Bob entangles his choices as in Eq. (10), there exists a U˜A such that
|〈Ψ1AB|U˜A|Ψ0AB〉| = 1− ǫ˜, (17)
where ǫ˜→ 0 as N →∞. Substituting Eq. (10) into this equation gives
p|〈ψ1AB(ω1)|U˜A|ψ0AB(ω1)〉|
+(1− p)|〈ψ1AB(ω2)|U˜A|ψ0AB(ω2)〉| ≥ 1− ǫ˜. (18)
Let
|〈ψ1AB(ω1)|U˜A|ψ0AB(ω1)〉| = 1− δ1, (19)
|〈ψ1AB(ω2)|U˜A|ψ0AB(ω2)〉| = 1− δ2, (20)
where 0 ≤ δ1,2 ≤ 1. Then Eq. (18) gives
ǫ˜ ≥ pδ1 + (1− p)δ2 > 0, (21)
for arbitrary p, which implies that as the security parameter N →∞,
δ1 → 0, (22)
δ2 → 0, (23)
like ǫ˜.
Comparing Eq. (19) and Eq. (20) with Eq. (15) and Eq. (16), respectively, we get
UA(ω1) ≈ U˜A ≈ UA(ω2), (24)
for arbitrary ω1 and ω2, such that in the limit of N →∞,
UA(ω1) = U˜A = UA(ω2). (25)
Consequently Alice only needs to calculate UA(ω) for any value of ω, and she can use it to
change her committed bit if she prefers - her chance of being discovered approaches zero
when the security parameter N approaches infinity.
Conversely, it is easy to see that if in any protocol one finds that the operator UA between
ψ0AB(ω) and ψ
1
AB(ω) depends on ω, then this protocol cannot be concealing, because when
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Bob entangles as in Eq. (10), the resulting pure states |Ψ0AB〉 and |Ψ1AB〉 are not connected
by an unitary transformation operating in Alice’s Hilbert space, implying that ρ˜0B 6= ρ˜1B.
In summary we have argued in this paper that Alice cannot possibly know all the proba-
bility distributions used by Bob, because they do not trust each other. Then for a complete
proof of the no-go result, one must also address the following question: In protocols where
Bob is allowed to use probability distributions unknown to Alice during the commitment
phase, can Alice still apply the entanglement attack? The answer we have arrived at is
positive for both perfect and imperfect concealing cases, so unconditionally secure quantum
bit commitment remains impossible.
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